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ABSTRACT:The rule of law theory should help us understand the issues that now, at 
the dawn of the third millennium, arise and need to be addressed so as to promote 
human rights and stop the arbitrariness of power in the context of an ever growing 
social  complexity  and  globalization.  It  can  certainly  be  asserted  that  these  issues 
configure a crisis of the rule of law that affects both the operation of the democratic 
structures  of  those  states  that  have  adopted  the  model  as  well  as  the  international 
protection of human rights. 
In the light of certain exogenous processes in which the use of force at international 
level has as justification the protection of human rights, however done by means that 
constitute by themselves breaches of international law, the classical scheme of state 
power distribution and differentiation, typical to the state of law, seems to be obsolete 
from a functional and spatial point of view, while the human rights theory is forced to 
deal with issues that by far exceed state limits thus becoming international. 
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  The „rule of law” theory should help us understand the new problems that now, at 
the dawn of the third millennium, must be approached in order to promote human rights 
and stop the arbitrariness of power in this context of ever-growing social complexity and 
globalization. These problems can be categorized as adding up to a crisis of the rule of 
law, crisis that affects both the functioning of democratic structures of those states that 
have adopted the model as well as the international protection of human rights
1. 
  The reasons for this crisis of the rule of law can be divided into two: first, the 
growing social complexity of advanced industrialized states involved in technological and 
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and Human Rights Watch, millions of people all around the world are, in present, victims of fundamental rights 
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informational revolutions, and, secondly, the integration processes both at regional level – 
see, for example, the European Union, and global level. Concerning the first point, of high 
importance are two aspects: the crisis of the ability of the legal system to regulate social 
relations and the decreasing efficiency in the protection of human rights. The second point 
includes, as a primordial issue, the erosion of state sovereignty and the prevalence of 
certain  powers  and  trans-national  bodies  that  are  not  subject  to  institutionalized 
mechanisms of power differentiation and distribution. 
  Certainly, it can not be argued that the philosophical premises of the rule of law are 
today in crisis. On the contrary, it can easily be determined that individualism seems to 
have penetrated every aspect of social life: from consumer habits to life style, from family 
to  professional  experiences.  What  seems  to  be  undergoing  a  crisis  is  the  governing 
capacity of the legal system, more exactly the regulatory efficiency and the application of 
legal norms. One of the explanations of this phenomenon of functional impasse indicated 
by the sociology of law consists of the so-called legislative inflation. 
  The differentiation process of social subsystems binds the legal system to react to 
their  rapid  development  through  the  elaboration  of  more  and  more  specialized  and 
particular legal provisions. However, law represents a rather rigid and slow structure in 
comparison  to  the  fast  and  flexible  evolution  of  other  social  subsystems,  such  as  the 
economic or scientific-technological one. This reality brings about legislative inflation 
and this in turn means depreciation, redundancy and normative instability. Not only has 
the number of normative acts increased but their texts has also become much too long, 
charged with technical terms and references to other legal provisions. 
  The fragmentary nature of the legal provisions, the references made to „emergency 
situations”, the tendency to rather programme than regulate only worsen the trend to make 
legislation lose its general and abstract character and become consequently more similar 
to  administrative  acts.  Obviously,  the  codification  model  with  its  adherent  claims  of 
clarity, systematization, universality and unchanging character over pass of time seems 
now, to a certain degree, a true historic relic, overwhelmed by a diffuse flood of micro 
legislation. 
  Alongside  such  a  phenomenon,  especially  in  the  case  of  the  European  states 
directly involved in political integration processes, correlates the multiplication not only 
of  domestic  normative  sources  but  also  of  supranational  ones.  The  tendency  towards 
anomy  due  to  normative  overcharge  is  thus  worsened  because  of  the  difficulty  of 
identifying  the  general  principles  of  the  legal  system  whose  definition  is  given  by 
jurisdictional  bodies  that  claim  the  prerogative  of  interpreting  national,  European  and 
international law. This creates a jurisprudentially made European law that, by definition, 
falls outside the boundaries of the rule of law
2.  
  The decreased regulatory capacity of law consequently affects the certainty of law 
and implicitly the legality principle is in peril. The hypertrophy of both criminal and civil 
law increases the power of interpretation of those that have to apply it, namely the judges, 
to such a degree that the courts detain o true normative power. Not only is ignorantia legis 
widely  spread,  the  nemo  censetur  ignorare  legem  becoming  absurd,  as  contented  by 
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professor  Gheorghe  Mihai,  for  citizens  are  incapable  of  knowing  which  normative 
provisions are in force and thus regulate social relations, but the deliberate ignorance of 
law has become a practice both in the activity of courts and of public administration. 
Accordingly, in the structure of the rule of law, the areas for ultra legem and, not seldom, 
contra legem autonomous decision processes are multiplied. 
Decreased  efficiency  of  human  rights  protection.  In  his  essays  regarding 
citizenship  in  Europe,  Thomas  Marshall  argued  that  the  recognition  of  civil  rights  – 
especially,  right  to  private  property  and  contractual  freedom  –  proved  to  be  fully 
functional up until the early stage of market economy extension. Political rights, on the 
other hand, appeared as a consequence of class fight characteristic to the 19th century, 
favoured the entrance of the working classes in the elitist institution of the liberal state. As 
far  as  social  rights  are  concerned,  Thomas  Marshall  underlined  their  radical  paradox. 
Unlike civil rights and most of the political rights, social rights were in contradiction with 
the acquisitive logic of the market, for social rights were in principle oriented towards 
equality  while  the  market  produces  inequality.  Despite  these  circumstance,  Thomas 
Marshall considered that the English institutions, moulded on the rule of law, will succeed 
in subordinating the market mechanisms to social justice and that, finally, the economical 
inequalities and the social competition would be to a great extend reduced. 
Despite the criticism brought to the analytical scheme built by Thomas Marshall 
due  to  its  evolutionary  reductionism
3, it however suggests a useful approach t o the 
relationship between the development of the market economy, the progress of the political 
institutions and the recognition of individual rights in modern Europe. Having this scheme 
as a starting point, it could be argued that the gradual recognition  of civil, political and 
finally social rights in continental Europe has been accompanied by a gradually more 
selective, legally imperfect and po litically reversible
4 protection. A sort of a decreasing 
efficiency law in the matter of human rights protection  could be argued. A law such as 
this one exists due to the different relationship that gradually has been established in 
Europe between the acknowledgement of human rights, on one hand, and the functional 
requirements of a political system correlated to th e market economy, on the other hand.  
Starting with the industrial revolution, the rule of law concept opened itself to the formal 
acknowledgement of  successive  generations of rights. The European Chart of Human 
Rights (December 2000), drawn up by delegations of 15 member states of the European 
Union has additionally extended the list of rights by including certain new ones, such as 
environmental protection, consumer protection, protection of physical integrity and the 
prohibition of reproductive clones
5. Taking all these into consideration, along the history 
of euro-continental constitutionalism, the formal recognition of new citizen rights has not 
been concurrently accompanied by their effective protection and application. 
                                                 
3 A. Giddens, „Class Division, Class Conflict and Citizenship Rights”, in A. Giddens, „Profiles and Critiques in 
Social Theory”, London: Macmillan, 1982, p. 171–173 and 176.  
4 D. Zolo, cited above, p. 47 and following. 
5 See the European Charter of Fundamental Rights, especially art. 3 (Right to integrity), art. 8 (Protection of 
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If this is the reality, it could be expected that the destiny of these new European 
rights to be the same one. In comparison to the civil rights, political rights have always 
been less deeply rooted in the European political tradition
6. 
Hans Kelsen argued that in the political party state of the 20th century the political 
rights of citizens are nothing more tha n a „totemic mask”, of sovereignty and popular 
representation – political institutions that no longer entail any effective participation in the 
exercise of power
7. 
  More obviously than the political rights, the social rights, from the moment of their 
apparition  –  the  Weimar  Constitution  –  have  been  less  efficient,  being  more  directly 
exposed to market contingencies. In order for social rights to be effective these require 
public services – social security, financial allocations, minimal standards of education, 
health, etc. – that consume a great quantity of resources. It results, consequently, that 
social rights, due to their considerable impact on fortune accumulation and taxation, are 
precarious. Today, because the global success of market economy has imposed on Europe 
the  need  to  reform  the  social  state,  social  rights  have  lost  to  a  great  extent  the  legal 
requirements of universality and actions – see, for example, right to work and right to 
health – and tend to become national assistance services discretionally provided by the 
political  power.  This  demonstrates  the  limitations  of  the  idea  argued  in  last  century 
Europe according to  which the rule of law  progressed  naturally  not only  towards the 
protection of the so-called negative rights but also towards the protection of substantial 
equalities. 
  According  to  certain  opinions  expressed  in  the  scholarly  literature,  the 
globalization  process,  by  depriving  states  of  an  important  part  of  their  traditional 
prerogatives, tends to reduce the functions of the state essentially only at assuring the 
internal-political  order.  According  to  this  opinion,  the  social  state  seizes  to  be  the 
safeguard of the collective good and transforms in the safeguard of the individual security 
of its citizens. 
  Erosion  of  state  sovereignty.  The  globalization  process  has  definitely  caused  a 
crisis of the sovereign state model – the collapse of nation-states sovereignty now seems 
to have become an irreversible process, states no longer being able to approach and solve 
global  issues,  such  as  environmental  pollution,  demographic  balance,  economic 
development, peace, repression of international crimes etc. and alongside nation-states 
appear  new,  powerful  subjects  on  the  international  scene,  such  as  multinational 
corporations,  regional  unions,  political  and  military  alliances,  non-governmental 
organizations. Besides international conventions and treaties, new sources of international 
law develop. Alongside these shifts, the judicial function and power tends also to expand 
towards an international level, additionally eroding the judicial sovereignty of the state, as 
proven  through  the  setting  up  of  ad-hoc  criminal  international  courts  and  of  the 
International Criminal Court in Hague
8. 
                                                 
6 At more then a century from the bourgeois revolutions, the right to vote is not recognized to everybody, but 
more so to certain categories chosen by market-related criteria. Additionally, large sectors of individuals 
marginalized economically were excluded from the right to vote up until the last century. This was the case for 
workers, farmers and women, whose political exclusion disappeared only at the middle of the 20
th century.  
7 H. Kelsen, „Doctrina pură a dreptului”, Humanitas, Bucharest, 2000, p. 288 - 289. 
8 P. P. Portinaro, „Beyond the Rule of Law: Judges’ Tyranny or Lawyers’ Anarchy?” in P. Costa, D. Zolo (Ed.), 
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  In  the  context  of  a  system  of  international  relations,  mainly  conditioned  by 
financial and economic corporations, the already weak governing capability of the state 
legal system becomes overwhelmed by the dynamics and the innovative decision power of 
the market forces. In the light of the above mentioned, international law goes through a 
series of changes, accompanied by a crisis of the international legality and of traditional 
functions of international bodies, especially the United Nations that  no longer has the 
ability to control the use of force at international level. In this context of general erosion 
of state sovereignty the traditional principles of respecting territorial integrity and political 
independence of states are under close scrutiny. 
  In light of exogenous processes, in which the use of force at international level has 
as justification the protection of human rights, done however by means that constitute in 
themselves  violations  of  international  law,  the  scheme  of  power  distribution  and 
differentiation, typical to the rule of law, seems to be obsolete from a functional and 
spatial point of view and the human rights theory is forced to deal with problems that by 
far exceed state horizons, being international
9. 
  Certain  authors  consid er  that  the  att empt  to  revival  state  sovereign ty  and  to 
conceive  cosmopolitan  projects  of  unifying  the  world  politically  and  legally  are 
unrealistic
10. Others argue that in the light of a future pos sible global constitutionalism a 
key-role could be played b y an international criminal court acting based on a universal 
criminal code. The new International Criminal Court is considered in this context as  one 
of the main instrument of human rights protection and repression of arbitrary actions of 
power at international level
11. 
  In this context of globalization it particularly presents interest for our research the 
impact that the integration of Romania in the European Union will have. Clearly, it is 
understood that the integration of Romania in the European Union  structures will impact 
considerably the sovereignty of the first. 
  At the beginning of the 1990’s, Romania made its choice for a constitution that 
would  fundament  the  classic  representative  democracy,  the  people  thus  becoming  the 
depositary of indivisible and inalienable sovereignty that it either delegates to its chosen 
representatives  or  exercises  directly,  by  means  of  referendum.  The  mandate  of  those 
chosen is representative in nature, assuming therefore that they act in the name of the 
nation and of its general interests. 
  The logic of the Union, nonetheless, was that the last states to integrate would have 
to adopt the European union acquis and therefore to adopt and respect already used rules 
of law and enter a pre-established institutional logic. 
  This  means  that,  firstly,  Romania  will  have  to  adopt  a  modern  approach  of 
sovereignty and realise that shared sovereign attributes with the Union represents a gain in 
comparison  to  the  transfer  of  certain  powers  related  to  the  control  of  economic  or 
commercial  activities  to  the  Bruxelles  institutions.  The  focus  will  be  made  on  the 
economic-political components of sovereignty.  
                                                 
9 D. Zolo, cited above, p. 49. 
10 See K. Ohmae, „The End of the Nation State. The Rise of Regional Economies”, The Free Press, New York, 
1995; J.-J. Roche, „Théories des relations internationales”, Editions Montchrestien, Paris, 1999. 
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  The integration of Romania in the European Union imposes the implementation of 
the European acquis and the alignment and adaptation of the Romanian legal system to 
the system of European norms and this reality objectively involves changes at the level of 
constitutional order. 
  All Romanian fundamental laws appeared over a period of one and a half century 
had as a central core the protection of national prerogatives. In this matter, the Romanian 
Constitution, adopted in 1991 and revised in 2003 is no exception, characterising and 
defining the elements of the Romanian state in article 1: „Romania is a national, sovereign 
and independent state”. 
  The main problem of integration, at least at a theoretical level, is represented by the 
ratio  between  the  supremacy  of  the  Constitution  and  the  priority  of  European  law  at 
national level. 
  The  Romanian  constitutional  order  is  essentially  altered  as  a  consequence  of 
adopting the European acquis, accomplished, in part at least, through the modification of 
the Constitution by Law no. 429 from 2003. The revised Constitution contains a general 
clause that authorises the transfer of power to the European Union (article 148). 
  The direct effect and supremacy of the European law are not clarified, still, after 
the 2003 revision of the Constitution.  Although after the first paragraph of  article 11 
(International  law  and  national  law)  a  new  paragraph  has  been  introduced,  it  is  still 
mentioned that the treaties represent sources of law only if Romania is a part. However, a 
great number of European rules of law that enjoy the prerogative of direct effect have as a 
source the court of Luxemburg. In the Romanian Constitution, the complete title of this 
article should be „The supremacy and direct effect of European law”. 
  The  belief  that  articles  148  and  149  implicitly  change  national  regulations, 
projecting on the latter ones the new situation derived as a consequence of the integration 
but  letting  the  interpretation  of  these  texts  to  one’s  own  wish  or  possibility,  has  no 
practical sustainability. 
  This solution adopted and maintained at the moment by the Romanian Constitution 
is  in  contradiction  with  the  position  adopted  by  the  European  Court  of  Justice  of 
Luxemburg as early as 1964, in the decision given in the Costa vs ENEL case: “It follows 
from all these observations that the law stemming from the treaty, an independent source 
of law, could not, because of its special and original nature, be overridden by domestic 
legal provisions, however framed, without being deprived of its character as community 
law and without the legal basis of the community itself being called into question.” 
  The  opened  questions  regarding  the  entire  experience  of  the  rule  of  law  are 
numerous. How could the certainty of law be restored in the so complex contemporary 
societies? What can be done to restore the abstract and general character of the legal norm 
and to stop the legislative inflation trend? Through what means can the legality principle 
regain its effectiveness considering that the power differentiation scheme is overwhelmed 
by phenomena such as: degenerative metamorphosis of political representation, technical 
decline of legislation etc. How is it possible to protect political rights and, more so, social 
rights given the privatization of social functions, the downfall of the public area and of 
social  solidarity  collectives?  What  will  the  destiny  of  new  rights  be,  especially  of 
foreigners when detained and trialled? What will become of environmental protection and 









CURENTUL JURIDIC                                                                                                       89                                                                
 
  Similarly, concerning international law, we wonder if it is possible to counteract 
the arbitrary of great  world economic and  military powers through legal  means? It is 
doubtful that Kelsen’s theory – peace through law – can be considered the most proper 
means of promoting international peace and reduce the political and economic imbalances 
in the world. More so, it is equally controversial the idea that a new vigour can be given to 
the state legal system allowing these to submit the global forces of the market to the rules 
of law. Similarly, it is not very clear in what way will the European Union be able to 
inspire itself from the rule of law model, freeing itself from the hegemony of powerful 
economic and financial interest and the usurpation of administrative bureaucracies. 
  Society  needs  an  authority  to  govern  it,  to  ensure  its  unity  and  order  and  to 
contribute to the common good. For the state to be able to fulfil its specific attributions, it 
must neither be overburdened with extreme requirements nor assume assignments that can 
much better be accomplished by the local communities. To this end, the minimization of 
the role of the state as an economic operator, the decentralization of resource allocation, 
the diminution of the distributive function of the state and the increase of the stimulating 
one,  the  restriction  of  the  bureaucratic  body  alongside  the  simplification  of  legal 
provisions, the transfer of certain normative attributions towards professional associations 
are just some of the solutions that could ensure a better functionality of the rule of law in 
Romania. 
The accomplishment of legal order in a state characterized by the rule of law can 
not  be  assured  unless  there  is  a  democratically  chosen,  representative  Parliament  that 
controls the ways in which state institutions follow the legal order in the rule of law. We 
believe  that  the  uninominal  vote,  recently  adopted  in  Romania,  after  seven  years  of 
parliamentary debates represents a start in solving the issue of the „clean character” of the 
Parliament.  Certainly,  the  uninominal  vote  has  its  deficiencies  and  is  far  from  being 
perfect but its introduction in a proportional system can to some degree be efficient, but 
no miracle changes are to be expected. We believe that the changes brought to the election 
system are welcome but they must be done with care and responsibility and must not have 
follow the short term political interest of any political formation or orientation but the 
insurance of long-term political stability. The advantage consist of the fact that through 
the uninominal vote the chances of true professionals, competent people to be chosen to 
represent the people increase, for they vote not a list but a name. The disadvantage is that 
at a certain moment it is possible that the Parliament be made up of persons from different 
parties,  with  different  aspirations  and  opinions,  and  this  could  lead  to  lack  of 
communication and disputes and not to a consensus in solving the general problems of the 
nation, as normal and fair. 
Theoretically, the three powers are separated and in balance. We cannot talk about 
their hierarchy. Between the three powers in the state the most efficient one should be the 
judicial one, from the perspective importance and not the subordination one for it has the 
attribution of settling any eventual malfunctions in the separation of power system and to 
protect the citizens’ rights and liberties. Justice can guarantee the functioning of the rule 
of law whenever the State falls in the pitfalls of certain elites that detour the resources and 
use these for their own interests. 
The legal order in a state characterized by the rule of law entails laws accordingly, 
general compliance with laws and whenever they are violated legal sanctions must be 
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constitutional principle of nemo censetur ignorarae legem ensures the legal order that 
characterizes the rule of law. Likewise, the revision of the entire legislation so that no law 
or  legal  provision  contravene  to  the  new  constitutional  dispositions  could  represent  a 
solution aimed at realizing the legal order compatible with the rule of law, and with the 
international provisions and regulations. 
As  far  as  the  present  judicial  system  is  concerned,  it  is  characterized  by  the 
slowness  of  the  procedure,  the  average  duration  of  the  trials  being,  generally,  quite 
lengthy. The longer the duration of the proceedings, the less chances that justice will be 
done. A just decision depends not only of the establishing of the truth and the correct 
application  of  the  law,  but  also  of  the  reasonable  duration  of  the  proceedings.  The 
revisions  of  the  Civil  and  Criminal  Procedure  Codes,  with  the  goal  of  reducing  the 
duration of the trials would be a measure aimed at regaining trust in the justice system and 
in the sentiment of justice. 
Concerning the political control exercised by the Government on the Parliament, in 
order to have a true responsibility of the ministers in front of the Parliament, a short term 
solution could be represented by the modification of the Senate’ and Deputy Chambers’ 
Regulations, in order to have a greater rigour. On the long term, however, a political 
education  in  the  spirit  of  democratic  values  and  mechanism  could  determine  a  better 
efficiency of the Romanian parliamentary system. 
  The  organic  law  should  regulate,  regarding  the  control  exercised  by  the 
Ombudsman, certain sanctions for those who refuse to collaborate or do so with delays, or 
refuse to support the Ombudsman in fulfilling its attributions. 
The  rule  of  law  should  be  based  on  the  following:  legitimacy  of  power,  its 
constitutionality, the separation of powers, protection of fundamental rights and liberties, 
political party pluralism and the limitation of power exercise for each public authority and 
agent of public power. Only by considering all of these criteria cumulated can we find 
ourselves in the presence of the rule of law. 
From the analysis of the constitutional provisions it results that Romania applies, in 
most part, the conditions that define the rule of law. However, this does not mean that 
they represent the entire ensemble of constitutive elements of such a system based on the 
rule of law, as demonstrated by the diversity of opinions in defining the rule of law. 
We appreciate that the functionality of the rule of law in Romania records, still, 
some deficiencies, in the following aspects: the parliamentary inertia in the normative 
process, the multiplication of judicial errors, the insufficient receptivity and promptness of 
the  administrative  bodies  in  applying  legislative  acts,  elements  that  breach  the 
independence of justice  such as the lack of professionalism of certain judges and the 
dependency  report  between  the  career  of  the  judges  and  the  ministry  of  justice,  the 
usurpation by the prosecutors, agent of the executive branch subordinated to the ministry 
of justice, of certain attributions of the judicial power, the lack of a true control function 
of the Parliament over the Government, the conflict relation between the President and the 
Prime-Minister,  as  functions,  manifested  particularly  through  the  tendencies  of  the 
President,  as  a  institutions,  to  subordinate  de  Government,  the  politicizing  of  the 
Constitutional  Court,  with  serious  consequences  for  the  quality  of  the  constitutional 
jurisprudence and political neutrality of its decisions and  with negative effects on the 
constitutional order and protection of human rights. 